[44] Administrative regimes do not attract s. 11 protections: Martineau, at paras. 22-23. “This Court has often cautioned against the direct application of criminal justice standards in the administrative law area”: Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307, at para. 88.
[45] Nor are the consequences truly penal. While a 90-day suspension is a meaningful consequence for a licensing violation, and the approximately $4,000 in possible costs and penalties are significant, they are not sufficient to engage the fair-trial rights embodied by s. 11 ― rights that, after all, are some of the most fundamental in our legal system. I note that financial penalties considerably more severe than those at issue here have been found to not constitute true penal consequences: see, e.g., Rowan v. Ontario Securities Commission, 2012 ONCA 208, 110 O.R. (3d) 492; Canada (Attorney General) v. United States Steel Corp., 2011 FCA 176, 333 D.L.R. (4th) 1; Lavallee v. Alberta Securities Commission, 2010 ABCA 48, 474 A.R. 295.
[46] Whether such penalties amount to penal consequences must of course be assessed relative to the conduct in question and the regulatory objective. The driving prohibition relates directly to the regulatory terms and conditions under which a person may be licensed to drive. Vehicle impoundment is directly related to the removal of drivers from the road, and drivers may apply to the Superintendent for review, including on compassionate and economic hardship grounds: MVA, ss. 262 and 263. The fine is capped at $500: Motor Vehicle Act Regulations, B.C. Reg. 26/58, s. 43.09. The remaining costs are tied to the various remedial programs, including installation of an ignition interlock device, and are incidental to the scheme’s objective of getting drivers and vehicles off the road. Such costs can hardly be considered to be penal, particularly when viewed in light of the public interest in removing a drunk driver from a roadway once detected.
[47] In summary, the ARP scheme does not create an “offence” within the meaning of s. 11 of the Charter . Thus, the protections of s. 11 are not engaged in this case.