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Suzuki of Newmarket
- Thread starter Dohhh
- Start date
Holmes
Well-known member
Ya I just got my second bike this season from them. Some issues with it running through the whole RPM range... They are trying to say that they may not cover it bc I didnt get my 1000km service... Oh and they tried to tell me my warranty is void cuz I did my oil changes myself at 500km and 1000km lol.
Oh well, hopefully all will get sorted tomorrow. If it does then I will come back.
Oh well, hopefully all will get sorted tomorrow. If it does then I will come back.
F
fitandfun1
Guest
Oh crap! Just bought a used bike off of them. They seem a little sketchy, but the mechanic doing the safety on my bike seemed to know his stuff. I pick it up tomorrow. Wish me luck! 
Wish me luck ya mean ;-) I'm riding the damn thing lol
Oh crap! Just bought a used bike off of them. They seem a little sketchy, but the mechanic doing the safety on my bike seemed to know his stuff. I pick it up tomorrow. Wish me luck!
Apparently it is worth checking the oil and coolant yourself before leaving SON as they seem to be having problems with these lately. If there are problems, do not ride the bike away, make them fix them before you take possession so you cannot be blamed for what happens.
Personally, irregardless of price I do not think I will think about buying a bike from SON unless there is a major shakeup there. I have heard of so many horror stories (most just basic stupidity on their part) that I wouldn't want to trust my life to anything they had come near.
Good luck fitandfun and gcrouse (ATGATTASONTAB, All the gear all the time after suzuki of newmarket touches a bike).
Personally, irregardless of price I do not think I will think about buying a bike from SON unless there is a major shakeup there. I have heard of so many horror stories (most just basic stupidity on their part) that I wouldn't want to trust my life to anything they had come near.
Good luck fitandfun and gcrouse (ATGATTASONTAB, All the gear all the time after suzuki of newmarket touches a bike).
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fitandfun1
Guest
jcarboni
Well-known member
I got my bike from them had 600km on it had a back firing problem .They check it for 10 mins told me there was nothing wrong and
said that will be 153.00 bucks .I ended up paying 53 to get it back.
Ended up being no water in the battery (From there PDI) and then they told me it may not be covered under warranty .
So I will never go back there again .
said that will be 153.00 bucks .I ended up paying 53 to get it back.
Ended up being no water in the battery (From there PDI) and then they told me it may not be covered under warranty .
So I will never go back there again .
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fitandfun1
Guest
Picked up my bike today and asked to speak to manager beforehand after having a couple of customer service issues and reading this thread. Actually spoke to the dealership owner, and while he was mildly concerned with the issues and the bad reputation of his business, he was also quick to tell me that they were number one in sales. Customer service is not a main concern at this dealership! When I asked to have fluid levels checked while I was there he said that it had nothing to do with the safety licensing that was done on a used bike. He couldn't even tell me if the oil had been checked, but assured me that the saleman helping me (Jason) would check them now. I'm just a newbie to the motorcycle world, but I certainly expect a dealership to check a few things before they sell me a used bike. Luckily I had gcrouse with me to check over a few things. The gas tank was almost empty. This was supposed to be full as part of the deal. I also noticed that they charged me for the gas anyway. Jason slinked away to get gas to fill the tank. Just before gcrouse got on the bike he noticed that the chain was loose. Gah! Sketchy service to say the least. I will never go back to SON for anything. Too bad to. This was just a used bike, but I was considering a new Suzuki next season. I'll go elsewhere thanks!
PS A special thanks to gcrouse for all of your help today!
PS A special thanks to gcrouse for all of your help today!
Please call me Gary Lisa Yw Lisa, will have to go for a ride sometime and maybe a little maintainance review of some basics if your up to it.
Yw Lisa, will have to go for a ride sometime and maybe a little maintainance review of some basics if your up to it.
Lisa they do have the best prices, so \i would go there for that but definetly not the service obviously.
Open Throttle
Active member
The best way to deal with Suzuki of Newmarket is to voice your concerns to Suzuki Canada. Although Suzuki Canada will refuse to take action at this point, due to the need of a Suzuki Dealer in the Newmarket area, they are noting and filing all Customer Complaints and will take action against Suzuki of Newmarket at a later date. Be patient the Dragon will be Slayed !!!!
Tdots illest
New member
did my own oil change at 1000kms and at 3000kms im leaking oil. Bring my brand new 2010 gsxr to SON and my chain was loose and must have done some damage. me being new to bikes i dont know **** all i tow my bike to SON and now they are telling me a voided my warranty by changing my own oil and that there is $1000 worth of damage done. i also payed for the 3 year extended warranty, but reading forums Suzuki only voids warranty for engine mods. anyone know anything i can do?
Go to another dealer do not let them near your bike. You can do you own maintenance and it does not void warranty.
OpenGambit
Banned
Going to another dealer should solve your problem, after that would be small claims but for 1000 its really not worth it.
but if you want to complain, the correct response ( if Suzuki Canada won't do anything ) is to complain to the competition bureau.
VERY VERY SORRY FOR THE LENGTH
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/home
Appendix III: Tying, Bundling, and Bundled Rebates There is a variety of ways in which products can be packaged together by a single firm; these combinations are commonly categorized as tying and bundling. Tying occurs when a firm that produces two or more products requires a buyer to purchase more than one product as a condition of sale; in other words, the firm refuses to sell product A to a buyer unless that buyer also purchases product B from the firm as well (and potentially products C, D, and so on).[SUP]68[/SUP] Bundling typically refers to situations whereby products are sold together in fixed proportions, i.e., product A is sold in a package with product B (and potentially products C, D, and so on).[SUP]69[/SUP]
Tying and bundling are ubiquitous in many, if not most, markets – cars, for example, are usually sold with four tires (a bundle of car and tires) and require service under warranty from the same manufacturer (a tie between product and service). Generally speaking, there are often strong cost efficiencies that motivate tying and bundling; it may be less costly for firms to manufacture and/or package products together, and it may be more convenient for consumers to purchase that package than search for each individual product. This convenience can also serve to increase demand among consumers who prefer to buy the products together. Tying and bundling may help firms achieve economies of scope, which often leads to higher quality products or lower total prices than if each product were forced to be sold separately and may also prompt firms to broaden their product offerings in order to maintain as complete a set of products as that of their competitors. Tying is also often used, like exclusive dealing, as a means of ensuring product quality and service levels, particularly in aftermarkets.
In some cases, demand for a package of products may be sufficient such that that tie or bundle is no longer a combination of individual products, but a product market in itself. The Tribunal recognized in Tele-Direct that tying (and by extension bundling), in the first instance, involves a determination as to whether there are in fact two separate products, or only one.[SUP]70[/SUP]
Tying and bundling may also allow firms to engage in various forms of price discrimination. One rationale is metering demand, such as where a firm ties or bundles aftermarket products to the sale of the principal product. For instance, a firm that sells a printer may require that consumers also use that firm’s aftermarket ink cartridges, either through technological restrictions or through exclusive supply arrangements. The net result is that the firm can charge more to high-demand consumers that use the printer more (i.e., require more ink cartridges). In some cases, the ability to meter can ensure that both low and high-demand consumers are able to purchase the principal product; if the firm can charge only a single price for its product and is unable to meter demand through tying, its profit-maximizing price may exclude low-demand consumers. If it can instead meter demand, it may be able to charge a lower price for the principal product.[SUP]71[/SUP]
Aftermarket tying that creates exclusivity, such as the examples above of a car requiring service under warranty from the manufacturer and printers requiring ink cartridges from the same firm, is one of the most common forms of tying in consumer markets. As a general principle, aftermarket tying raises competition issues only under limited circumstances. While aftermarket tying may restrict third-party access to service a particular brand, a brand itself will not necessarily constitute a relevant product market if consumers see other brands and products as substitutes, and so the owner of a particular brand will not necessarily hold a dominant position. Where aftermarket tying is common across brands within a particular product market – i.e., most or all of the firms in a market engage in aftermarket tying – the Bureau will examine the extent to which those firms compete for the customer in the first instance. If customers can choose between competing firms when buying the initial product and are widely aware of the subsequent aftermarket tying for that product, the Bureau will consider customers as taking that condition into account when purchasing the initial product, and firms as competing amongst each other across several dimensions of competition, including aftermarkets, when attempting to capture that customer.[SUP]72[/SUP]
However, there are certain circumstances under which both tying and bundling can be anti-competitive, if they are able to make it more difficult for non-tying/bundling rivals to compete. Theoretically, tying and bundling can be anti-competitive in two ways. First, to the extent that tying and bundling may raise the costs (or reduce the revenues) of non-bundling rivals, it may become more difficult to compete in the market(s) for standalone products, leading to possible exclusion or disciplining of otherwise effective competitors. Second, by discounting a package of products, tying or bundling may constitute predatory conduct. Where that package of products is properly classified as a separate relevant product market (i.e., the bundle itself is seen as a single product, not a package of separate products), the Bureau will analyze it as predatory conduct to determine whether the bundle, as a single product, is being sold below its total average avoidable cost.
One traditional concern with tying (which can hold for bundling as well) is "monopoly leveraging", where a firm with market power in one market attempts to achieve a similar position in an otherwise competitive second market by engaging in tying between two markets. This will only be considered as potentially anti-competitive if it can deter the entry or expansion of rivals in the second market.[SUP]73[/SUP] Anti-competitive "monopoly leveraging" is possible only under certain conditions; as noted above, a necessary condition is that it artificially raises rivals’ costs (or reduces rivals’ revenues). For example, if the tie captures enough customers desiring both products to keep rivals from obtaining efficient scale or covering the fixed costs of serving only standalone customers, or if the tie raises rivals’ costs or reduces their revenues by increasing consumer switching costs, for which consumers would have to be compensated, this theory may hold. In industries characterized by important fixed costs of production, this can also occur over time if tying discourages investment in research and development by competitors, or otherwise discourages potential dynamic innovation that would be profitable for competitors only if a larger portion of the market were contestable. Where it appears that a firm with market power is engaging in tying for the purpose of an intended negative effect on a competitor (or competitors) without a valid business justification as discussed above, the Bureau will examine the extent to which this may raise competitors’ costs or reduce their revenues, with the result that competition in a market is substantially lessened or prevented.
Tying and bundling (particularly bundling) can also be viewed as direct price competition. Where it appears a firm is selling a bundle of products primarily as a means of offering discounts to buyers, the Bureau may choose to examine such conduct under a predatory standard, in order to avoid chilling legitimate price competition. In this case, the key issue is whether the appropriate relevant market definition is the entire set of products, or whether component products comprise separate relevant product markets. Where the bundle is determined to be a single product market, the Bureau will assess whether the total bundle, as opposed to individual products within the bundle, is below average avoidable cost. In such a case, the Bureau will then examine whether this will result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition, namely whether the bundling firm is able to engage in recoupment by raising the price of its bundle once its standalone competitors have been disciplined or eliminated. Where the appropriate market definition is separate products (for example, there are distinct groups of consumers that purchase the bundle and purchase some or all of the products on a standalone basis), it may be more appropriate to assess the extent to which the bundling firm can raise the costs of rivals offering standalone products, as described above.
Bundled Rebates
One specific form of conduct that falls under the category of packaged selling is bundled rebates. A bundled rebate is a practice whereby a firm offers a buyer a discount on a product if that buyer purchases a second product (or more) from the firm as well. For example, a buyer may receive a 15% discount on product A if it purchases product B from the same firm.[SUP]74[/SUP]
Bundled rebates were considered by the Tribunal in Canada Pipe. Canada Pipe, which was found to hold a dominant position in markets for cast-iron pipe, couplings, and fittings, offered distributors a stocking distributor program (SDP) that provided a system of rebates based on purchasing all three types of product exclusively from Canada Pipe. The Bureau argued that the SDP acted as a barrier to entry by foreclosing potential entrants and existing competitors from accessing distributors, with the result that competition was lessened substantially in markets for these products. In the Tribunal’s view, however, the switching costs (in the form of foregone rebates) faced by distributors moving their business from Canada Pipe to competitors were not great enough for this barrier to be significant. Ultimately, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the Tribunal had made an error in law in applying paragraphs 79(1)(b) and 79(1)(c) to the facts of the case, and the matter was eventually settled by a registered consent agreement between the Bureau and Canada Pipe.
Like other types of bundling and tying, bundled rebates may be considered either exclusionary or predatory conduct. For example, bundled rebates to retailers or distributors may have an exclusionary effect on competitors by raising their costs of getting their product or products to end consumers (or reducing their revenues by forcing them to match a discount), just as exclusive contracts would. Just as exclusive contracts render less of a market contestable, bundled rebates can have the same effect if the effect of a distributor or retailer foregoing the discount is sufficient to induce exclusivity or otherwise raise the costs of rivals, or reduce their revenues, to the point where they are less effective competitors.[SUP]75[/SUP] In all cases, bundled rebates can enhance competitor barriers to entry in any or all of the product markets over which rebates are offered.
At the same time, bundled rebates can be a form of price competition, particularly when they are targeted at final buyers. In this case, bundled rebates may be assessed as predatory conduct, consistent with the Bureau’s approach to predation outlined in these guidelines. Where a bundled rebate comprises a separate relevant product market (i.e., the bundle is properly considered a single product, rather than a package of standalone products), the Bureau will assess it using a predatory standard. The Bureau recognizes that bundled rebate programs are often complex and may have several different percentage targets depending on each product; it may be appropriate to aggregate these when determining effective product prices for any price-cost analysis.
but if you want to complain, the correct response ( if Suzuki Canada won't do anything ) is to complain to the competition bureau.
VERY VERY SORRY FOR THE LENGTH
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/home
Appendix III: Tying, Bundling, and Bundled Rebates There is a variety of ways in which products can be packaged together by a single firm; these combinations are commonly categorized as tying and bundling. Tying occurs when a firm that produces two or more products requires a buyer to purchase more than one product as a condition of sale; in other words, the firm refuses to sell product A to a buyer unless that buyer also purchases product B from the firm as well (and potentially products C, D, and so on).[SUP]68[/SUP] Bundling typically refers to situations whereby products are sold together in fixed proportions, i.e., product A is sold in a package with product B (and potentially products C, D, and so on).[SUP]69[/SUP]
Tying and bundling are ubiquitous in many, if not most, markets – cars, for example, are usually sold with four tires (a bundle of car and tires) and require service under warranty from the same manufacturer (a tie between product and service). Generally speaking, there are often strong cost efficiencies that motivate tying and bundling; it may be less costly for firms to manufacture and/or package products together, and it may be more convenient for consumers to purchase that package than search for each individual product. This convenience can also serve to increase demand among consumers who prefer to buy the products together. Tying and bundling may help firms achieve economies of scope, which often leads to higher quality products or lower total prices than if each product were forced to be sold separately and may also prompt firms to broaden their product offerings in order to maintain as complete a set of products as that of their competitors. Tying is also often used, like exclusive dealing, as a means of ensuring product quality and service levels, particularly in aftermarkets.
In some cases, demand for a package of products may be sufficient such that that tie or bundle is no longer a combination of individual products, but a product market in itself. The Tribunal recognized in Tele-Direct that tying (and by extension bundling), in the first instance, involves a determination as to whether there are in fact two separate products, or only one.[SUP]70[/SUP]
Tying and bundling may also allow firms to engage in various forms of price discrimination. One rationale is metering demand, such as where a firm ties or bundles aftermarket products to the sale of the principal product. For instance, a firm that sells a printer may require that consumers also use that firm’s aftermarket ink cartridges, either through technological restrictions or through exclusive supply arrangements. The net result is that the firm can charge more to high-demand consumers that use the printer more (i.e., require more ink cartridges). In some cases, the ability to meter can ensure that both low and high-demand consumers are able to purchase the principal product; if the firm can charge only a single price for its product and is unable to meter demand through tying, its profit-maximizing price may exclude low-demand consumers. If it can instead meter demand, it may be able to charge a lower price for the principal product.[SUP]71[/SUP]
Aftermarket tying that creates exclusivity, such as the examples above of a car requiring service under warranty from the manufacturer and printers requiring ink cartridges from the same firm, is one of the most common forms of tying in consumer markets. As a general principle, aftermarket tying raises competition issues only under limited circumstances. While aftermarket tying may restrict third-party access to service a particular brand, a brand itself will not necessarily constitute a relevant product market if consumers see other brands and products as substitutes, and so the owner of a particular brand will not necessarily hold a dominant position. Where aftermarket tying is common across brands within a particular product market – i.e., most or all of the firms in a market engage in aftermarket tying – the Bureau will examine the extent to which those firms compete for the customer in the first instance. If customers can choose between competing firms when buying the initial product and are widely aware of the subsequent aftermarket tying for that product, the Bureau will consider customers as taking that condition into account when purchasing the initial product, and firms as competing amongst each other across several dimensions of competition, including aftermarkets, when attempting to capture that customer.[SUP]72[/SUP]
However, there are certain circumstances under which both tying and bundling can be anti-competitive, if they are able to make it more difficult for non-tying/bundling rivals to compete. Theoretically, tying and bundling can be anti-competitive in two ways. First, to the extent that tying and bundling may raise the costs (or reduce the revenues) of non-bundling rivals, it may become more difficult to compete in the market(s) for standalone products, leading to possible exclusion or disciplining of otherwise effective competitors. Second, by discounting a package of products, tying or bundling may constitute predatory conduct. Where that package of products is properly classified as a separate relevant product market (i.e., the bundle itself is seen as a single product, not a package of separate products), the Bureau will analyze it as predatory conduct to determine whether the bundle, as a single product, is being sold below its total average avoidable cost.
One traditional concern with tying (which can hold for bundling as well) is "monopoly leveraging", where a firm with market power in one market attempts to achieve a similar position in an otherwise competitive second market by engaging in tying between two markets. This will only be considered as potentially anti-competitive if it can deter the entry or expansion of rivals in the second market.[SUP]73[/SUP] Anti-competitive "monopoly leveraging" is possible only under certain conditions; as noted above, a necessary condition is that it artificially raises rivals’ costs (or reduces rivals’ revenues). For example, if the tie captures enough customers desiring both products to keep rivals from obtaining efficient scale or covering the fixed costs of serving only standalone customers, or if the tie raises rivals’ costs or reduces their revenues by increasing consumer switching costs, for which consumers would have to be compensated, this theory may hold. In industries characterized by important fixed costs of production, this can also occur over time if tying discourages investment in research and development by competitors, or otherwise discourages potential dynamic innovation that would be profitable for competitors only if a larger portion of the market were contestable. Where it appears that a firm with market power is engaging in tying for the purpose of an intended negative effect on a competitor (or competitors) without a valid business justification as discussed above, the Bureau will examine the extent to which this may raise competitors’ costs or reduce their revenues, with the result that competition in a market is substantially lessened or prevented.
Tying and bundling (particularly bundling) can also be viewed as direct price competition. Where it appears a firm is selling a bundle of products primarily as a means of offering discounts to buyers, the Bureau may choose to examine such conduct under a predatory standard, in order to avoid chilling legitimate price competition. In this case, the key issue is whether the appropriate relevant market definition is the entire set of products, or whether component products comprise separate relevant product markets. Where the bundle is determined to be a single product market, the Bureau will assess whether the total bundle, as opposed to individual products within the bundle, is below average avoidable cost. In such a case, the Bureau will then examine whether this will result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition, namely whether the bundling firm is able to engage in recoupment by raising the price of its bundle once its standalone competitors have been disciplined or eliminated. Where the appropriate market definition is separate products (for example, there are distinct groups of consumers that purchase the bundle and purchase some or all of the products on a standalone basis), it may be more appropriate to assess the extent to which the bundling firm can raise the costs of rivals offering standalone products, as described above.
Bundled Rebates
One specific form of conduct that falls under the category of packaged selling is bundled rebates. A bundled rebate is a practice whereby a firm offers a buyer a discount on a product if that buyer purchases a second product (or more) from the firm as well. For example, a buyer may receive a 15% discount on product A if it purchases product B from the same firm.[SUP]74[/SUP]
Bundled rebates were considered by the Tribunal in Canada Pipe. Canada Pipe, which was found to hold a dominant position in markets for cast-iron pipe, couplings, and fittings, offered distributors a stocking distributor program (SDP) that provided a system of rebates based on purchasing all three types of product exclusively from Canada Pipe. The Bureau argued that the SDP acted as a barrier to entry by foreclosing potential entrants and existing competitors from accessing distributors, with the result that competition was lessened substantially in markets for these products. In the Tribunal’s view, however, the switching costs (in the form of foregone rebates) faced by distributors moving their business from Canada Pipe to competitors were not great enough for this barrier to be significant. Ultimately, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the Tribunal had made an error in law in applying paragraphs 79(1)(b) and 79(1)(c) to the facts of the case, and the matter was eventually settled by a registered consent agreement between the Bureau and Canada Pipe.
Like other types of bundling and tying, bundled rebates may be considered either exclusionary or predatory conduct. For example, bundled rebates to retailers or distributors may have an exclusionary effect on competitors by raising their costs of getting their product or products to end consumers (or reducing their revenues by forcing them to match a discount), just as exclusive contracts would. Just as exclusive contracts render less of a market contestable, bundled rebates can have the same effect if the effect of a distributor or retailer foregoing the discount is sufficient to induce exclusivity or otherwise raise the costs of rivals, or reduce their revenues, to the point where they are less effective competitors.[SUP]75[/SUP] In all cases, bundled rebates can enhance competitor barriers to entry in any or all of the product markets over which rebates are offered.
At the same time, bundled rebates can be a form of price competition, particularly when they are targeted at final buyers. In this case, bundled rebates may be assessed as predatory conduct, consistent with the Bureau’s approach to predation outlined in these guidelines. Where a bundled rebate comprises a separate relevant product market (i.e., the bundle is properly considered a single product, rather than a package of standalone products), the Bureau will assess it using a predatory standard. The Bureau recognizes that bundled rebate programs are often complex and may have several different percentage targets depending on each product; it may be appropriate to aggregate these when determining effective product prices for any price-cost analysis.
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Tell them to shove it.
I'd have to disagree there. I found it very easy to file with Small Claims court and I got a judgement in my favour which I was then able to use to get my money back. It was only for about $350 but I was able to claim all the court fees and interest on top. If the judge finds in your favour then you are able to make a claim against the company/individual involved. If they refuse to pay you can send in a baliff to recover goods to the value of your claim**. It helped that a close friend is a baliff. For $1000 I'd do it in a heartbeat.
**Please check this 'advice' as it's simply my understanding of the situation and not fact enscribed in Law.
A buddy of mine is having issues with SON as well, no surprise there, The lifters are noisy as hell and they say they cant hear anything.... it's loud.The bike is less than a year old Anyway i'm going with him this w/e with paper and pen in hand and when they say they cant fix it i will have them sign what i quoted them, and when they say there might be a charge i will be asking who authorized a fee when it is clearly a warranty issue, again please sign. They are quick to sell , their CC is atrocious . I wont stop until they fix his bike!!!!!!!!!!!!
Open Throttle
Active member
One reason why Suzuki of Newmarket has an incompetent bike shop is because they do not have a licenced bike tech in their shop / they are all unlicenced techs / when they safety bikes they have an automotive tech in their auto shop sign for it. Wow is that not odd? a bike shop full of unlicenced bike techs.
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