It all depends on your jurisdiction, and what specific options were on the back of your ticket. There are two ways to schedule a first attendance meeting.
Option #1 - Selection 2 on the back of your ticket requests for the meeting
Option #2 - Selection 3 on your ticket is for trial and you separately fill out a form request a meeting with the prosecutor
Most of the GTA has streamlined to option #1, and this was purposefully to reduce 11b charter challenges.
The 11b clock starts from the date you file your intentions to go to trial, till your trial date. So with option #1, if you fail to come to a resolution with the prosecutor... then the prosecutor schedules a trial date. So your intention to go to trial happens when your resolution fails, and that's when your 11b clock starts ticking.
There have been a lot of decisions since the Justice Libman's 11b decision
R. ex rel City of Toronto v. Andrade, 2011 ONCJ 470. It's in your best interest to go through all of them.
https://www.canlii.org/en/on/#search/jId=on&sort=decisionDate&all=andrade 11b
R. v. Jair, 2013 ONCJ 142 (CanLII)
22. I have assigned 90 days, or three months, as neutral Intake period to the period from December 6, 2011 to March 6, 2012. I assign 60 days or two months to Limits on Institutional Resources in relation to the period from March 6, 2012 to May 6, 2012.
38. The total delay attributable to institutional delay and the actions of the Crown amounts to 11.5 months.
41. Balancing all of the factors in this case, I have reached the conclusion that Ms. Jair’s rights under s. 11(b) of the Charter were infringed and that her rights and society’s rights to a prompt trial outweigh the societal interests in bringing accused persons to trial. Accordingly, I stay the proceedings under s.24(1).
You'll have to read the entire decision as a whole, but the JP ended up assigning the early resolution time as a "neutral" delay.
Corporation (City of Mississauga) v. Lam, 2012 ONCJ 734 (CanLII)
[61] On the question of how to treat the five-month delay from April 29, 2011, to September 29, 2011, that is associated with the scheduling and holding the first attendance meeting with the prosecutor, that period can be regarded as an implict waiver by the defendant since the defendant had opted on April 29, 2011, to have a voluntary or optional first attendance meeting with the prosecutor; however, since the purpose or function of the first attendance meeting is for the resolution of the charge then it is more suitable and practicable for the 11(b) paradigm to find this delay as part of a “neutral intake period” that is to be deducted from the overall length of delay.
Is the time required to be eligible for 11b a moving target? If it his, who decides what's correct? Is it a political decision or do the JP's talk to each other? I didn't think JP's could set (or were bound by) case law.
Time calculations are done during a pre-trial motion, and it's up to the residing JP to rule who's responsible for each individual delay. Just because you get the golden number of +11 months (R. v. Andrade), doesn't necessarily mean you'll get a constitutional stay. You have to show the courts how the delay has caused you harm.
R. v. Szewczyk, 2012 ONCJ 680 (CanLII)
[185] After assessing and balancing these factors, I have determined that of the 20-months and 18-days of overall trial delay in this proceeding from February 11th, 2011 to October 29th, 2012, a period of 11 months and 22 days is attributable to institutional or systemic delay for which the prosecution is responsible.
[186] Furthermore, I have determined that the defendant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that he suffered either actual or inferred prejudice as a result of the degree of institutional or systemic trial delay relative to the subject speeding charge.
[187] Accordingly, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities, that the defendant’s right to be tried of the subject offence within a reasonable time under subsection 11(b) of the Charter, has not been infringed. The defendant is not, therefore, entitled to a remedy under subsection 24(1) of the Charter.
[188] The defendant’s application under subsections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter is therefore denied.
